Summer Term 2016
Experimental methods, Lecture and tutorial
Urs Fischbacher (lecture) and Dominik Baur with Konstantin Hesler (tutorial)
Monday, 15:15-16:45, A702, lecture
Monday, 17:00-18:30, A702, tutorial according to schedule
Experiments have established their own role in economics as a source of knowledge. Experiments allow testing the behavioral assumptions underlying economic modeling; they provide tests for the empirical validity of different models and permit to establish behavioral regularities even when a theory is not yet available. Experiments also guide the researchers in the development of new theories. So, without experiments, prospect theory and social preference theories would be without relevance, since the relevance could not be proven.
This lecture gives an introduction into the experimental method in economics. It should enable you to design, plan, conduct, and analyze an economic experiment. Furthermore, it presents typical and prototypical experimental designs.
On August 2nd students may view their exam from 11 to 12 in Room F 315
On November 16th, students may view their exam from 11:30 to 12:00 in Room F 315
Master Seminar Behavioral Economics
Irenaeus Wolff
Overview
At the focus of this seminar are the prominent "behavioural" models to explain procrastination, anomalies in decision-making under risk, fair behaviour, honesty, and strategic reasoning and behaviour (discussed in the lecture Behavioural Economics). The aim of the seminar is to work with these models in creative ways. There are three basic ways in which this may be achieved: a model can be applied to a new situation (e.g., who in a couple should look after the child if they are motivated by Fehr-Schmidt preferences, depending on the comparison groups?), different models can be synthesised into a new model (e.g., do I procrastinate more if my reference point is procrastination, subject to my given beta-delta preferences?), and model aspects can be tested experimentally to modify existing models in a certain direction (e.g., adapting salience-based level-k to account for discoordination-game data). Alternatively, participants can present recent modelling developments, contrasting different approaches (e.g., social projection in Breitmoser, 2015, versus evidential reasoning in Al-Nowaihi/Dhami, 2015), exploring possible experimental designs for a horse-race comparison. As a final option, participants may review a whole literature branch (e.g., the literature on preferences for ex-ante vs preferences for ex-post fairness), to organise it and to find determinants for behaviour depending on certain characteristics of a situation.
Requirements
- Preparation of a research proposal (+ of an improved version)
- Careful reading of others' proposals and short discussions of two randomly selected proposals
- Support in preparing and conducting experiments (if applicable)
- Participation in the discussion.
- Final thesis of up to 12 pages. For the grade, participation (including discussions of other proposals) makes up 40%, the thesis 60% of the final grade.
Required knowledge
- Decent knowledge of game theory.
Schedule
kick-off meeting: Monday, 11. April 2016, 10:00 – 11:30 in F 208
block 1: Friday, 22.04.2016 09:00-17:30
block 2: Monday, 30.05.2016 09:00-17:30
block 3: Friday, 01.07.2016 09:00-17:30
Location for blocks: TWI, Hauptstrasse 90, Kreuzlingen, Switzerland.